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The Contested Value of Normative 
Legal Scholarship
Robin West
A part of the contemporary skepticism about the value of a legal education 
and, more broadly, the value of the legal academy is focused on the perceived 
lack of value in legal scholarship: scholarship that, as currently confi gured, is 
a part of the legal academy’s mission and, certainly alongside law school 
graduates, its major product. Legal scholarship is under attack from critics 
inside the legal academy itself,1 from the other departments and parts of the 
university, and perhaps most publicly from the bench and bar.2 The bill of 
particulars, unsurprisingly, given the multitudes against it, is lengthy and 
internally contradictory. According to its critics from the bench and bar, legal 
scholarship is overly precious: It is excessively “theoretical,” self-consciously 
interdisciplinary, not grounded in the “real world,” increasingly esoteric, and 
1. See, e.g., PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
(1999) (criticizing normative legal scholarship for participating in law rather than studying 
it); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982) (criticizing all 
critical legal scholarship); Paul W. Kahn, Freedom, Autonomy, and the Cultural Study of Law, 13 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 141 (2001) (criticizing all normative legal scholarship); Pierre Schlag, 
Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening, 97 GEO. L.J. 803 (2009) 
(criticizing legal scholarship as sycophancy and mediocrity that mimics the bench); Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983) (criticizing 
traditional legal scholarship as a worshipping of false idols).
2. See, e.g., Harry Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 19, 2011) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/after-law-school-
associates-learn-to-be-lawyers.html?_r=0. Chief Justice Roberts famously complained at a 
Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference meeting in 2011 that “the fi rst article [in any law review] 
is likely to be, you know, the infl uence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 
18th Century Bulgaria, or something, which I’m sure was of great interest to the academic 
that wrote it, but isn’t of much help to the bar.” J. Harvie Wilkinson III, A Conversation with 
Chief Justice Roberts, C-SPAN (June 25, 2011), www.c-span.org/video/?300203-1/conversation-
chief-justice-roberts. See also Ronald K.L. Collins, On Legal Scholarship: Questions for Judge Harry 
T. Edwards, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 637 (2016); Law Prof. Ifi ll Challenges Chief Justice Roberts’ Take on 
Academic Scholarship, ACS BLOG (July 5, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/law-prof-ifi ll-
challenges-chief-justice-roberts%E2%80%99-take-on-academic-scholarship; Brian Leiter, 
David Segal’s Hatchet Job on Law Schools, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. REPORTS (Nov. 20, 2011), 
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2011/11/another-hatchet-job-on-law-schools.
html.
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7not particularly useful to either judges or lawyers. It is therefore of no value.3 
On the other hand, according to critics from other parts of the academy, legal 
scholarship suﬀ ers from almost precisely the opposite fl aw: The student-
edited law reviews are fi lled with faux scholarship that virtually by defi nition 
is insuﬃ  ciently disciplined, woefully undertheorized, and overly utilitarian.4 
Collectively, it aims to make a better legal mousetrap, but adds little or nothing 
to our store of knowledge about the world.
From within the legal academy, the criticisms are somewhat more precise, 
because better-informed by a knowledge of the nature of the beast, but they 
parallel those made by outside critics from the bench, bar and academy. And 
they too are internally contradictory. One group of critics from within the legal 
academy—I’ll call them the scholarly purists—charge that too much of our legal 
scholarship—and particularly doctrinal scholarship, which is, still, most legal 
scholarship—is overly “normative.”5 Its aim is to make the law better, rather 
than to explain or describe subtle or nonobvious features of law or the legal 
system. Therefore, say the scholarly purists, it is not truly scholarship; rather, 
it is political posturing under the guise of scholarship. True historians, after all, 
don’t tag policy prescriptions onto their historical analyses. Empiricists of all 
stripes, quantitative and qualitative, aim for truth, not reform or justice or the 
good, in their writing. Even philosophers aim to clarify, not dictate, what those 
philosopher kings might think, or what they have thought in the past, and so 
on. So “normative legal scholarship”—the type of scholarship that says “the law 
is x but it ought to be y”—to the scholarly purists is oxymoronic. To whatever 
degree it is “normative,” it’s not “scholarly.” As we—legal “scholars”—seek to 
mold, or shape, or reshape, or reform, or radically alter law, in the pages of our 
law reviews, we undercut or betray our scholarly ambitions. 
A second camp of critics, still within the legal academy, I’ll call the “legal” 
or “professional” purists. For the legal purists, legal scholarship must be 
normative—legal scholarship, if it is to be truly “legal,” must aim to engage 
the professional work of either improving the law or preserving its goodness. 
It must aim to engage the law from what is sometimes called the “internal 
perspective,” and the internal perspective of law, whatever may be true of other 
subjects, simply is normative, through and through. For these critics, too much 
contemporary legal scholarship—and particularly, these days, the work done 
by legal empiricists of various stripes—may well be “scholarship” about law, 
in some sense, and may as such be of interest to colleagues in other parts of 
3. See Edwards, supra note 2; Collins, supra note 2 at 645, 656.
4. These complaints from academics in other parts of the academy are rarely stated in print. 
For a recent exception, however, see Christopher Chabris & Joshua Hart, How Not to Explain 
Success, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/10/opinion/sunday/
how-not-to-explain-success.html (reviewing AMY CHUA & JED RUBENFELD, THE TRIPLE 
PACKAGE: HOW THREE UNLIKELY TRAITS EXPLAIN THE RISE AND FALL OF CULTURAL GROUPS 
IN AMERICA (2014)) (noting that according to the anonymous reviewers of their review essay, 
the book under review by two law professors was not worthy of an essay, as it was written by 
law professors with no expertise in empirical methods).
5. See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 1; KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW, supra note 1.
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the university, but it is not truly legal scholarship, and precisely because it has 
no normative bite.6 Legal scholarship must be “internal” to the legal system 
and the legal profession; it must engage the law on its own terms. Therefore, 
much of the current work on law informed by methods and insights from other 
disciplines, although perhaps of interest, isn’t legal scholarship: not because it 
isn’t scholarly, but because it isn’t truly legal. 
So, to summarize and simplify, according to one of these various camps 
of either internal or external critics, much of what we call “legal scholarship” 
may be scholarship but it’s not “law”—it is too academic, too disciplined, too 
theoretic, and too detached, of no use to the profession and therefore of no 
value; or, according to another camp, much of what we call legal scholarship 
may be “legal” but it’s not true scholarship—it’s nothing but legal writing in 
disguise, elaborated memoranda for courts, legislators, or regulators, but it’s 
not scholarship. Legal scholarship, in short, is on the horns of a “normativity” 
dilemma. To some critics, legal scholarship isn’t scholarship, because it’s too 
normative, while to another camp, it may be scholarship, but it isn’t legal 
because it’s not normative enough. For every critique, both inside and outside 
the academy, one can fi nd its opposite, also forcefully voiced. Legal scholarship 
does not want for critics.
I won’t take on all of these critics, although I do hope to in some detail in 
a forthcoming book. Here I want to address only one of these complaints, 
as voiced by critics of legal scholarship in the legal academy, and echoed 
by critics from other parts of the university: to wit, that legal scholarship is 
somehow not “true scholarship,” because so much of it is overtly normative. 
Legal scholarship, according to this strand of criticism, isn’t true scholarship 
because of the dominance of “ought” statements: If it aims to improve the law, 
or the world law governs, and aims to do so through using legal materials and 
a legal methodology, it isn’t scholarship.7 So—we shouldn’t do it. As Stanley 
Fish pithily put the point, we should “save the world on our own time”—and 
6. See, e.g., Rena I. Steinzor & Alan D. Hornstein, The Unplanned Obsolescence of American Legal 
Education, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 447, 457-64 (2002) (academy’s pursuits increasingly esoteric, 
divorced from needs of practicing bar). In a foreword to the Harvard Law Review, Neal 
Katyal defends legal theory in legal scholarship for its eventual impact on legal outcomes, 
but also partially criticizes it for not attending to the professional needs of future lawyers. 
Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
65 (2006). For related critiques of empirical legal studies as sometimes prompting the 
“why should we care” question, see Brian Leiter, On So-Called “Empirical Legal Studies” and Its 
Problems, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. REPORTS (July 6, 2010), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.
com/leiter/2010/07/on-socalled-empirical-legal-studies.html (blog entry on empirical legal 
studies). The best general critical analysis of empirical legal scholarship to date is Pierre 
Schlag, The Knowledge Bubble—A Diagnostic for Expertopia (Mar. 9, 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2741144) (impossibility of claiming knowledge of any 
piece of legal datum without also occupying an internal perspective on it, thus losing the 
detachment necessary for empiricism; to do so renders empirical legal scholarship always 
paradoxical and fundamentally problematic). 
7. KAHN, Freedom, supra note 1; Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 
(1990). 
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he might have added, on our own dime—if we’re intent on saving the world.8 
We shouldn’t aim to do it in the classroom or in scholarship. We should aim, 
rather, in our scholarship, for truth, and for knowledge, within the confi nes of 
some academic discipline that embraces the goal, not for social betterment. 
If this complaint takes hold, then normative legal scholarship—by which I 
mean all legal scholarship that is of the form “the law is x but it should be y”—
whether from the political left, right, or center, whether it is about the United 
States Constitution or international law or human rights law, or municipal 
traﬃ  c ordinances, whether it aims to improve law through doctrine, through 
statute, or by helping the law work its way pure, whether it is motivated by a 
sense of justice or a sense of injustice, by aesthetics, or by raw self-interest—all 
of that work is not just bad scholarship. Normative legal scholarship—by virtue 
of its normativity—is not scholarship at all. That’s the complaint I want to 
address here, which I’ll call the anti-normativity complaint. At the end of my 
comments, I’ll briefl y address the fragility of critical legal scholarship, which 
I take to be a form of normative scholarship—but is for various reasons even 
more threatened, and far more criticized, in the current skeptical climate.
So, fi rst, on normative legal scholarship: Both Stanley Fish and, for diﬀ erent 
reasons, Professor Paul Kahn of Yale Law School have argued that we just 
shouldn’t do it—we should not engage the work of advocating what the law 
should be.9 What, then, should legal scholars do, if we forgo saving the world 
on someone else’s dime and time? Although he doesn’t make the explicit 
analogy to law, I think there are two possible paths for legal scholarship to 
take if we take seriously the Fishian anti-normativity complaint—that we 
should save the world on our own time. First, legal scholars might return to an 
early-twentieth-century sense of their mission: Legal scholars could set about 
the task of correctly stating what the law IS. The aim of such work would be 
to state the law correctly, using the traditional doctrinal methods of law—
“reasoned elaboration” of the doctrine, as Hart and Sacks suggested in their 
Legal Process materials,10 or, more grandly, perhaps, a herculean restatement of 
law that aims for an intergenerational and highly principled description of 
the existing law, as Ronald Dworkin urged through a fi fty-year career.11 No 
normative judgments—no claims about what the law should be—but rather a 
sincere attempt to employ one’s legalistic expertise to state the content of the 
law correctly. That alone can be a formidable task: It’s not easy to get the First 
Amendment right with respect to an ordinance or state law regulating hate 
speech or pornography in cyberspace,12 or commercial speech on billboards 
8. STANLEY FISH, SAVE THE WORLD ON YOUR OWN TIME (2012).
9. FISH, supra note 8, KAHN, supra note 1. 
10. HENRY HART, JR., ALBERT SACKS, WILLIAMS ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP FRICKEY, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (2006).
11. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF 
PRINCIPLE (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986, 1994); RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE 
FOR HEDGEHOGS (2011).
12. See, e.g., DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014).
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along the highway.13 It’s not easy to properly state—or predict—what judges 
may or may not do with the consideration doctrine when faced with a plaintiﬀ  
who has reasonably relied to his detriment on a promise that was not part of 
a bargain, or how a judge might react to a plaintiﬀ  claiming under the tort of 
the intentional infl iction of emotional distress in a jurisdiction that has not 
recognized such a tort, or whether a judge will modify, restrict or extend the 
holder in due course doctrine where a holder of a negotiable instrument is 
faced with the claim that it was granted as a part of a fraudulent transaction. 
If we forgo normativity, we could aim to be better chroniclers of the law; we 
could aim to state what the law in any of these contested areas truly is, where it’s 
not clear or obvious or settled. That work can, after all, involve generational, 
herculean wisdom. It could certainly consume a career. It would add to our 
knowledge of the world, by clarifying what the law is.
We might, though, not fi nd that satisfying; and, in fact, for decades now, 
explication of the law that “is” has not been central to the work of many 
scholars in the legal academy—although that does not, of course, mean 
that it is not work that more of us should be doing. Alternatively, if we fi nd 
explication of the law unsatisfying, we could take part in the interdisciplinary 
work of some of our colleagues, either in the law schools themselves or in the 
rest of the university. We could contribute to the projects originating in and 
guided by other disciplines of better understanding our economy, our politics, 
our culture, our history, or our humanities canon by oﬀ ering our specialized 
knowledge where those projects implicate law in some way. We would, then, 
be contributing to the “store of knowledge” about the law by adding legal 
analysis to projects themselves guided by the ideals and the methods of other 
disciplines within the university. The scholarly task would be to ensure that the 
particular legal claims that might be made in the larger historical, economic, 
political, or philosophical scholarly projects—originating from outside the 
fi eld of law and outside the legal academy—are correct restatements of law. 
We could then help to situate law as the subject of scholarly projects in other 
disciplines, with some confi dence that the law so situated is correctly described. 
The aim of such scholarship would most assuredly be to improve our 
collective understanding of law. It would not be, however, to improve the law 
itself. We would be acting as legally trained experts, guides to the historians, 
empiricists, philosophers, economists, and humanists defi ning the project, 
and, as such, we would be embracing, with them, the “external perspective.” 
We would be doing so, of course, with legal sophistication, and that adds a 
lot. But we would not be doing so toward the end of improving the law that 
is, or of engaging with the legal materials from the internal perspective, or of 
informing our understanding of the law by our sense of justice. We would not 
be doing so, in short, as lawyers, committed to the project of law. We would 
be doing so as legally sophisticated outside analysts, observers, or scholars. If 
we shed the normative ambition of our work—our attempt to better the law—
we would be more true to the aims of the larger academy, very traditionally 
13. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
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understood. We would forgo, however, the aims of the profession—we would 
not be aiming to either improve or preserve the law. If we want to be scholars, 
so this criticism goes, that is precisely what we should do. We can’t be scholars 
if we’re going to be lawyers, and perhaps vice versa as well.
I hope that gives the fl avor of the “anti-normativity critique” I’m seeking 
to address. “Normative legal scholarship” is an oxymoron, because true 
scholarship cannot be normative. Much—maybe most—of what we call legal 
scholarship is normative, therefore, much of what is traditionally called legal 
scholarship is just not scholarship at all; it’s something else. Now, the aim of 
this critique is clearly not just to clear the air by advising a re-appellation. The 
aim of the critique, almost always, as far as I can tell, is to counsel against 
doing it.
Let me begin my response to the anti-normativity critique by noting the 
ubiquity or the ordinariness—the normalcy—of normative legal scholarship 
in the legal academy over the past century and a half. It’s all around us; it’s 
most of what we do. It comes in various forms, no doubt, at least half a dozen 
that I can count, but I’ll mention just two. First, what we have taken to calling 
(sometimes in the context of hiring or appointment decisions) “traditional 
doctrinal scholarship,” such as policy-based scholarship, or precedent-
based scholarship—the scholarship often informally derided as “extended 
briefs”14—is clearly an example, perhaps the core example, of normative legal 
scholarship: It aims to state the law of something accurately, expose problems, 
and then proﬀ er a reform or reformulation that better aligns with stated or 
sometimes unstated ideals. But normative legal scholarship is clearly not 
always of this form. Normative legal scholarship also includes what I’ll call “big 
idea” pieces, such as, for example, Benjamin Zipursky and John Goldberg’s 
pioneering work revitalizing an older understanding of tort law as a law of 
wrongs rather than the “law of accidents,”15 or the Israeli scholar Hanoch 
Dagan’s work unearthing the public-regarding theories of justice in contract,16 
or Larry Kramer’s arguments from the beginning of the century about and 
against judicial review in constitutional law,17 or the work of a number of legal 
economists, such as Kaplow and Shavell, arguing that only our tax policies 
and not legal rules should aim for distributive justice.18 All of that work, and 
14. Informally, and formally in faculty meetings, not in print.
15. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917 (2010)
(arguing that tort law has lost its traditional meaning as concerned with legal wrongs, and 
has instead become centrally concerned with allocating accident costs eﬃ  ciently).
16. HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, AND RETHINKING PRIVATE 
LAW THEORY (2013).
17. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (2005).
18. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002); Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice, 
32 J. LEGAL STUDIES 331 (2003); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of 
Liability, 37 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Accuracy].
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much else besides, is “normative legal scholarship,” as I understand the phrase. 
Likewise, the work of countless scholars, too many to name, putting forward 
claims that the Equal Protection Clause actually means x although its more 
often understood as meaning y, and because of that, our aﬃ  rmative action 
policies are either forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment or permitted by 
that same source, or indeed mandated by it. And so on. ALL of this scholarship 
in some form is about what law ought to be and not only what our law is: 
The Equal Protection Clause ought to be understood as requiring this; or the 
consideration doctrine properly read precludes enforcement of these sorts of 
contracts; or people who suﬀ er purely emotional harms ought to be able to 
recover in tort, and so on. Scholarship of the form “the law is x but ought to be 
y”—whether the law in question is a traﬃ  c ordinance or the First Amendment 
or a human rights declaration or NAFTA—is the bread and butter of legal 
scholarship. It’s what we all think we know how to do; more than any other 
skill, inclination or ideal, it’s a skill we all share, an inclination we all harbor; 
it defi nes an ideal, even—a version of leaving the world a better place than we 
found it—for our scholarly lives in law. Normative legal scholarship may have 
become more exciting or more theoretical or more interdisciplinary or more 
sophisticated or more philosophical and so on over the past couple of decades, 
or maybe not. But it has been the bread and butter of legal scholarship now—
defi ning what we do and, for many, perhaps most of us, what we ought to be 
doing—for over a hundred years. It still is. If we take the critique of normative 
legal scholarship on board, we will have to jettison the bulk of our scholarly 
work.
Now, the anti-normativity critique has been around for a while, but not 
quite as long a while, as traditional legal scholarship itself. It has had a number 
of strands. Roberto Unger, in his classic essay The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 
derided the normative work of his liberal legal colleagues for reifying our 
deepest commitments and stultifying radical critique of the legal status quo by 
engaging in only marginally reformist legal advocacy in their overly formalist 
legal scholarship.19 Law Professor Pierre Schlag from University of Colorado 
wrote a trenchant series of articles in the late 1980s attacking normative legal 
scholarship of all stripes as anti-intellectual, politically cowardly, and deeply 
subservient to a political overclass.20 More recently, Yale’s Professor Kahn 
oﬀ ered an extended and less politicized critique of normative legal scholarship 
in his book The Cultural Study of Law;21 he argued, basically, that “internal” legal 
scholarship pursues the wrong ideal: If legal scholars are going to contribute at 
all to the larger truth-seeking project of the academy, we simply must distance 
19. Unger, supra note 1.
20. Schlag, supra note 7. See also Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
801 (1991); Pierre Schlag, Le Hors de Texte, C’est Moi’ The Politics of Form and the Domestication of 
Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1631 (1990); Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach 
to Law, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1989); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 
(1985).
21. KAHN, supra note 1.
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ourselves from the legal culture that should be our subject matter, and we just 
cannot do that if we are simultaneously participating in it.22
Since those essays were written, however, the anti-normativity critique 
has picked up new adherents: The legions of interdisciplinary scholars with 
training in other disciplines and the academy-wide hiring of the J.D./Ph.D. 
entry-level law professors may have broadened and deepened the appeal 
of the anti-normativity argument.23 The typical J.D./Ph.D. scholars often 
increasingly eschews normative legal scholarship—not necessarily for the 
reasons given by Unger, Schlag, or Kahn, but rather by dint of training and 
outlook. The goal of the scholarship produced by many (certainly not all) of 
the J.D./Ph.D. scholars is not in any sense governed by, or even related to, 
the normative ambitions of the bench, the bar, or the legal academy, as it was 
once understood. For many such scholars, the goal is truth, not justice. The 
purpose of such work is understanding; it is not to make the law better.
What, though, is the case against normative legal scholarship? Is there still 
room in the legal academy for scholarship that aims to improve the law, or to 
preserve it, by resort to the tools, doctrines, insights, and values of law itself? 
If not, why not? What is the argument against it, beyond the question-begging 
claim that it simply is not truly “scholarly,” if its ambition is justice rather than 
truth? 
As I hope my quick catalog of the anti-normativity critiques shows, a 
number of complaints are wrapped into the anti-normativity critique. Let me 
focus on just one, rarely explicitly articulated, but nicely captured in the spirit 
of Stanley Fish’s book title: “Save the World on Your Own Time.”24 Fish’s 
complaint—that scholars in the humanities should not preach their politics in 
the classroom—was aimed at his colleagues in English departments, but legal 
scholars doing “normative scholarship” are unequivocally guilty of the same sin. 
While English professors may preach politics surreptitiously, law professors, 
particularly in their normative scholarship, overtly and unapologetically try to 
save the world in their (or our) scholarship. The complaint, in brief, captured 
by Fish’s title is that overtly normative legal scholarship is not scholarship at 
all, because it is “political.” It’s politics: It’s sloganeering, or it’s campaigning. 
And, like all political arguments, normative legal scholarship is not grounded 
in reason, but rather in passion or sentiment, or, even worse, in partisan 
politics. It’s not grounded in recognizably scholarly or academic values. 
Real scholarship needs to be, should be, or must be empirical, descriptive, 
dispassionate, reasoned. Arguments about the world of the “should” or 
arguments of the form “the law should be thus and so” are on the values side 
of a fact/value divide, and for that reason they are political, plain and simple, 
and, as such, have no place in legal scholarship. The recent move toward 
empiricism in legal scholarship has sharpened the contours of this complaint 
22. Id. 
23. Lynn LoPucki, Dawn of the Discipline-based Law Faculty, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 506 (2016).
24. FISH, supra note 8. 
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and has put pressure not only on normative scholarship but on other forms 
of legal scholarship as well, including critical scholarship—itself a form of 
normative scholarship, but with more emphasis on critique than reform—legal 
theoretic work, and clinical scholarship. But it has unquestionably put the 
most pressure on normative legal scholarship: traditional legal-scholarly work, 
whether bounded by or informed by doctrine, policy, or political morality, 
that aims to make the law—hence the world—better.
Two otherwise dramatically diﬀ erent and even opposed practices within 
contemporary normative legal scholarship to some degree undercut the force 
of this critique: The fi rst, to which I’ve already alluded, I’ll call the quasi-
Dworkinian practice of normative scholarship, and the second I’ll call the 
quasi-Posnerian practice. Both, in very diﬀ erent ways, prescribe ways of 
doing normative legal scholarship that self-consciously avoids the charge of 
politicization implicit or explicit in the anti-normativity critique. Both prescribe 
ways of doing normative legal scholarship, in other words, that avoid the need 
to make explicitly moral or political claims about the way the law ought to be. 
Dworkinian normative legal scholarship, in brief, strives for true statements 
about what the law is, thus avoiding the complaint of undue politicization, but 
rests on the foundational claim that any such striving always rests, necessarily, 
albeit in part, on explicit or implicit moral or political principles embedded 
in the law itself. Even the driest and most purely “descriptive” of legal claims, 
Dworkin thought, with a good deal of justifi cation, rest, and necessarily so, 
on claims about the legal ought, simply because the law itself, which the 
descriptive legal claims aim to capture, incorporates moral principle.25 Saying 
that the consideration doctrine requires an exchange of values, for example, 
is saying something about which contracts should be enforced; saying that 
the First Amendment prohibits state law that in turn prohibits hate speech or 
pornography is saying something about the idealized content of the doctrine; 
saying that heirs inherit under the rules of intestacy is saying something 
about whether murderous heirs who kill for gain should or should not profi t 
from their own wrong.26 If Dworkin is right, then even purely descriptive 
analytic work that purports to do nothing but say what the law is is normative 
through and through; it’s turtles all the way down. Legal analysis—indeed 
every “statement of law”—just is normative, and necessarily so, if Dworkin’s 
early accounts of legal argumentation, contained in his near-iconic early book 
Taking Rights Seriously, are sound. Many scholars in the legal academy have 
considerable sympathy for the view, and the work of many others, whether 
self-consciously Dworkinian or not, that aims for principled statements or 
restatements of law that make law the best it can be, essentially bears witness 
to its plausibility. But note that nowhere in the Dworkinian account is the 
scholar, much less the judge, given rein to place his “own” political or moral 
views in the law being explicated, whether in the unsettled periphery or the 
25. Dworkin defends this view in his classic work, RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY, supra note 11.
26. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 11, at 86-87. 
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settled core of legal doctrine. The law, within Dworkinian scholarly as well as 
judicial practice, is not simply positivistically there to be molded according to 
the moral or political predilections of the scholar, judge, or lawyer. The moral 
principles, rather, are in the law being explicated. 
The second practice, still within normative legal scholarship, that to some 
degree undercuts the anti-normativity critique, is “quasi-Posnerian.” The aim 
of the practice embodied by this sizable body of work, which goes far beyond 
the outer boundaries of the University of Chicago, is to tame or rationalize 
the normativity of traditional legal scholarship by recharacterizing normative 
claims as “cost-benefi t analysis.” Quasi-Posnerian normative legal scholarship 
aims, in part, to transform what would otherwise be “moral” claims about 
what the law should be, or what the world should do or be, into claims of 
“fact”: the “benefi ts” and “costs” of various policies, laws, or rules drawn from 
cases.27 The result, if this Posnerian translation works, is that “normative legal 
scholarship” can be both normative and rational and nonpolitical. Benefi ts and 
costs, after all, are facts of the matter, even if we do generally regard benefi ts as 
good and costs as bad. We can then make claims about what the law ought to 
be and avoid the claim that we are politicking in the classroom or on the pages 
of law reviews. We avoid the sting of the anti-normativity critique if we stick to 
our knitting, meaning, if we stick to the tabulation of costs and benefi ts, and 
whatever inferences might be fairly drawn from those tabulations.
Now, I believe, and have argued elsewhere, that “normative legal 
scholarship”—scholarship about what the law should be—including not only 
Dworkinian and Posnerian practices but also practices that are not Dworkinian 
and not Posnerian in the slightest—is important work, whether or not one wants 
to call it “scholarship.” It has great social value. It is—sometimes—moving, 
and persuasive, and insightful, and creative, and it quite often infl uences not 
only our law, but also our political environment and the world of ideas in the 
university.  It is often, not just occasionally, the foundation of extrajudicial law 
reform movements as well as the basis for judicial interpretations of existing 
law, the claims of Roberts and Edwards to the contrary notwithstanding.28 
And, it is worth noting, it is also sui generis: It’s not done anywhere except in 
law schools. If the legal academy abandons these practices because of the sway 
of the anti-normativity critique, they will not be pursued elsewhere: the bench 
and bar, for diﬀ erent reasons, lack the time, resources, and detachment from 
client interests that is required to do it well, and the rest of the academy lacks 
the investment in the ideals that distinctively defi ne the legal profession. If 
we forgo this work, our worlds, not only the legal world, but our social and 
cultural and political worlds, will be the worse for it. Again, I have argued this 
at length elsewhere.29
27. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2011). See also Kaplow and Shavell, Accuracy, supra note 18. 
28. See Roberts, supra note 2, and Edwards, supra note 2.
29. See ROBIN WEST, TEACHING LAW: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE DEMANDS OF PROFESSIONALISM 
(2014); ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION (2011).
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What I want to add here is simply that both our idealized and our real 
normative legal scholarship—the scholarship we aim to produce and that we 
should aim to produce, and that aims at a coherent explanation of what the 
law should be—extends well beyond the Dworkinian or Posnerian practices 
described above. Rather, normative legal scholarship can be implicitly and 
sometimes explicitly what both Dworkinian scholarship and cost-benefi t 
scholarship try to ward oﬀ : utopian, overtly political, aspirational, heartfelt 
and impassioned. I’ll call the practice I want to defend here “impassioned 
normativity.” Impassioned, normative legal scholarship should also, of course, 
be humble: As is true of all scholarship, it should be open to objection and 
informed by our understanding of law and legal institutions. But normative 
legal scholarship is basically about what justice requires, and the degree to which 
law delivers on what justice requires or the degree to which law should deliver 
on what justice requires. If that’s right—if normative scholarship is about what 
justice requires—then such scholarship is and should be rooted in passion, 
as well as intellect. If the charge against “normative scholarship” is that it is 
political, ethical, moral, emotional, and impassioned, rather than rational, 
reasoned, intellectual, descriptive, or empirical, I would suggest that rather 
than try to limit normativity or our defense of it to only those forms of it—
the Dworkinian and Posnerian forms—that seem to be the most rational, 
we instead at least consider embracing the passionate root of justice, of our 
understanding of it, and hence of our normative scholarship. Legal scholarship 
is and should be about what justice requires. It therefore must be normative. 
To the degree, which I believe is considerable, that justice is itself a product 
of our passion, it must also, therefore, be impassioned. It is not captured in 
Posnerian fashion by costs and benefi ts, and it is not captured in Dworkinian 
fashion by the institutional decisions made in the past—by precedent, in other 
words, even as discerned by herculean judges.
Nevertheless, there is a problem with both impassioned and rationalist forms 
of normative scholarship, as well as with the defense of such scholarship, that 
is entirely diﬀ erent from the Fishian complaint that we are inappropriately and 
unethically trying to save the world on the law schools’—and hence the law 
students’ and the taxpayers’—dime. When lawyers as well as law professors 
focus on what we might be able to do with law to bring the legal system more 
into alignment with what we think the law ought to be, we sacrifi ce, to some 
degree, our critical voice—precisely because our sense of the way law ought 
to be is so heavily infl uenced—nearly determined—by the bulk of the law 
that is, with much of that law that “is,” being given, so to speak, a critical 
“pass.” When we do that—when we focus on the normative—“when we all 
become pragmatists now,” to paraphrase the paraphrase of the paraphrase—
we internalize a huge loss. To correct for that loss, we in the legal academy 
and we as a society need legal scholarship that has no normative ambition 
whatsoever. We need such scholarship, however, not because, by virtue of 
having no reform-defi ned goal, it will thereby be better, or because it will 
therefore more dispassionately state what the law “is,” or something truer—
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because more dispassionate—about the economic or political meaning or 
consequences of law, or about our legal history or the role of law in political 
history. All of that may be true, but it’s not the point. We need scholarship that 
has no normative ambition whatsoever so that we can better understand, and 
therefore better criticize, the world we inhabit. By focusing our work in the 
legal academy on our normative ambitions—by focusing on law as a means 
to justice—we risk losing, to some degree, our focus on law as a means of 
exploitation, legitimation, subordination, and suﬀ ering. We lose our focus, in 
other words, on law as a means to injustice, and on the role of law in promoting 
the ends of power, rather than the role of law in promoting the common good. 
Both rationalist and impassioned normative scholarship—scholarship that 
aims to show what the law ought to be—is in need of defense today against the 
presumed hegemony of the positive economic analysis of law, of descriptive or 
analytic legal scholarship, of purely historical scholarship, of treatise writing, 
and of some but not all interdisciplinary scholarship. I am happy to defend 
both impassioned and rationalist normative scholarship against those forces—
not to displace any of those other forms of scholarship, but to keep the work 
at the table. But normative scholarship itself is also a threat to something even 
more marginalized by all of those forces, and that is critical legal scholarship, 
meant both narrowly, as it was defi ned in the seventies and eighties, and more 
broadly, meaning scholarship with no direct normative ambitions whatsoever, 
but with the aim of better understanding our own situation, which just might 
be so steeped in injustice that no legal fi x in the world will come close to 
correcting it.
If we want to understand our currently unjust milieu, I believe, we need 
big, ambitious scholarship that is unabashedly critical and unabashedly non 
or even anti-normative. We in the legal academy need to aggressively carve 
out space for that work; because if we don’t, it will disappear. If we want to 
use law to further the ends of justice, we also need big, ambitious scholarship 
that is unabashedly normative. We need to aggressively carve out space for 
that work as well. But make no mistake about it: If we want to understand 
how our law serves the ends of injustice, we need big, ambitious scholarship 
that is unabashedly non-normative and non-pragmatic, that doesn’t aim for 
the legal fi x, but aims instead for understanding. Right now, normative legal 
scholarship—even of the rationalist, Posnerian or Dworkinian variety and 
certainly of the non-Posnerian and non-Dworkinian—is under quite severe and 
even vicious attack. But critical scholarship is in even worse shape; it is so vilifi ed 
it has shrunk in its scope and ambition. The legal academy has, to its credit, 
at diﬀ erent points over the past half-century been a welcoming environment 
for both normative and critical legal scholarship; the legal academy has at 
various times understood such scholarship as central to its mission and to its 
distinctive contribution. We need to become one again. Doing so won’t be 
easy. In fact, it will require self-consciously resolute conviction.
